TRIBAL LENDING AFTER GINGRAS
MAX KING†

ABSTRACT
Online payday lenders pose serious risks for consumers. Yet,
for years, these lending companies have skirted state regulation
by pleading tribal sovereign immunity. Under this doctrine,
entities that are so affiliated with tribal nations that they are “an
arm of the tribe” are immune from suit. Without comprehensive
federal regulation, tribal sovereign immunity has served as a
trump card at the pleading state for online payday lenders.
The Note argues that change may be on the horizon. In the
recent decision Gingras v. Think Finance, the Second Circuit
held that the Supreme Court’s holding in Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community permitted injunctive suits against tribal
affiliates, acting in their official capacity off reservation, based
on state law. If other courts adopt the Second Circuit’s
reasoning, states and consumers will be far better equipped to
tackle online payday lenders.

INTRODUCTION
Proudly displayed on the website of online payday lending
company, Big Picture Loans,1 is short history of Michigan’s Chippewa
Tribe.2 The timeline labeled “Our History” begins in the 1600s, when the
Chippewas “achiev[ed] sustainability through fishing, hunting, and
gathering natural foods.” Three panels later, the timeline explains that the
Tribe now lives on a reservation in Watersmeet, Michigan, where it
“strives to preserve the integrity of this land for future generations to
enjoy.”3 Below the timeline, in a section titled “Our Business,” the page
says that the Chippewas formed Big Picture Loans to “enhance the Tribe’s
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Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2021.
About Us, BIG PICTURE LOANS, http://www.bigpictureloans.com/about-us (last
visited Apr. 2, 2021).
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The Chippewa are members of the Michigan Anishinaabe tribes. “Anishinaabe”
is the singular version of the name that the Chippewa (Ojibwe), Ottawa (Odawa),
and Potawatomi (Bodewadomi) Nations of the Great Lakes use to refer to
themselves. “Anishinaabe” means “original people.” See Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. REV. 296, 297 n. 8
(2011). See generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA
INDIANS (2012).
3
Id.
1

123

Tribal Lending After Gingras

[Vol. 19

self-determination and further diversify the Tribe’s economy.”4 The
section further informs readers that the lending company “is an economic
arm and instrumentality of the Tribe,” and “is organized and licensed
under Tribal law and is located on the Tribe’s reservation.”5
What the section does not explain is that “arm of the Tribe” is a
legal term of art. Native American tribes enjoy tribal sovereign immunity
unless Congress authorizes suit against them or the tribe waives its
immunity.6 Some federal circuit courts and state supreme courts have
adopted “arm of the tribe” tests to determine whether tribal sovereign
immunity protects commercial entities associated with Native American
tribes.7 Generally speaking, if a commercial entity is so closely affiliated
with a Native American tribe that they are an “arm of the tribe,” and
granting the immunity will promote the tribe’s economic development, the
commercial entity will be immune from suit.8 That means that Big Picture
Loans is not simply describing its relationship with the Chippewa Tribe;
it is asserting that the relationship shields it from legal culpability.
Big Picture Loans is not unique in this respect. Many online
payday lender companies use tribal affiliations to benefit from tribal
sovereign immunity.9 This Note will describe these companies’
problematic lending practices, discuss how they have partnered with
Native American tribes, and detail the legal doctrines granting these
companies immunity. This Note will also summarize state and federal
attempts to regulate online payday lenders. Tribal immunity has stymied
many state efforts,10 and the federal government has not yet taken
comprehensive measures in this area. However, a recent Second Circuit
decision, Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc.,11 may chart a new path forward.
There, the Second Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in
4
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Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
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1173, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010); Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170,
177 (4th Cir. 2019); White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014);
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See, e.g., Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1188.
9
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N.C. L. REV. 326 (2012) (detailing sovereign immunity claims made by online
payday lenders).
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Id. at 328.
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Gingras v. Think Fin., Inc., 922 F.3d 112 (2nd Cir. 2019).
5
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Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community12 permitted injunctive suits
against tribal affiliates, acting in their official capacity off reservation,
based on state law.13 Should other courts adopt the Second Circuit’s
reasoning, states and consumers will be far better equipped to reign in
online payday lenders.

I. ONLINE PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES
Payday loans harm consumers by ensnaring them in “debt traps,”
wherein they are forced to take out multiple loans they cannot pay back in
order to cover existing obligations. These debt traps are the key source of
profit for payday lenders. This Part explains what payday loans are, why
they are profitable, and how they harm consumers. Additionally, this
section will describe how Internet payday lending companies partner with
Native American tribes to circumvent regulation. These “rent-a-tribe”
schemes grant companies sufficient connection with a Native American
tribe for them to benefit from the tribe’s sovereign immunity. In the best
version of the model, the affiliated tribe will receive investment capital,
jobs for tribe members, and a share of the profits from the business in
return. How often this truly happens, though, is questionable.

A. What are Payday Loans?
Payday loans are high-cost, short-term credit arrangements,
typically offered on 14-day repayment terms.14 Internet lender companies
distribute these loans through their websites, often advertising the speed
and simplicity of their application processes.15 Borrowers fill out
application forms on lenders’ websites, disclosing their names, addresses,
phone numbers, Social Security information, employment information and
income, and checking account information.16 Borrowers are also required
to write postdated checks for the amount they owe plus interest.17 The
lender will hold the check until the borrower’s next payday, hence the
name “Payday Loan.”18 When the loan is due, the borrower can redeem
12

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
Gingras, 922 F.3d at 121.
14
Lauren K. Saunders et al., Stopping the Payday Loan Trap, NAT’L CONSUMER
L. CTR 4 (2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/
payday_loans/report-stopping-payday-trap.pdf.
15
See, e.g., CHECK CITY, https://www.checkcity.com/services/payday-loans/ (last
visited Mar. 12, 2020) (“[W]ith a fast, convenient payday loan from Check City
you won’t have to worry. A payday loan is has [sic] a quick application process,
is surprisingly easy to qualify for, and it’s incredibly affordable.”).
16
See, e.g., PAYDAY CHAMPION, https://www.paydaychampion.com/onlineapplication/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
17
Saunders et al., supra note 14.
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Id.
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the check, allow it to be deposited, or pay a finance charge and roll the
loan over to the new pay period at a new fee.19 Many consumers with bad
credit scores find these services attractive because they can procure the
loan quickly and easily ,20 even though pay day loans’ Annual Percentage
Rates (APRs) range from 391% to 789%.21
Hardly anything else is attractive about these loan services,
however. While traditional lenders check that borrowers will be able to
pay their loans back before disbursing funds,22 payday lenders do not.23
Instead, payday lenders solicit consumers who likely cannot pay back their
loans and will thus opt to roll their loans over to a new pay period with
even higher fees. Even though many online payday lenders advertise their
loans as short-term commitments, people who use payday lenders end up
taking out an average of eight to nine loans annually.24 Lenders’ business
model, in fact, depends on these customers returning for new loans.
Borrowers who take out five or more loans a year generate ninety percent
of the industry’s business; borrowers who take out twelve or more loans a
year generate sixty percent of their business.25 To be sure, a study by the
Center for Responsible Lending found that seventy-six percent of payday
loans are taken out to pay back prior payday loans.26 This loan churning
results in an extra $3.5 billion in fees annually.27 As borrowers take out

19
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Saunders et al., supra note 14, at 4.
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Petrovich, supra note 9, at 326.
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Saunders et al., supra note 14, at 4.
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Uriah King & Leslie Parish, Springing the Debt Trap: Rate Caps are Only
Proven Payday Lending Reform, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 8 (Dec. 13,
2007), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/
research-publication/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf.
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Id. at 9.
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Uriah King & Leslie Parish, Phantom Demand: Short-Term Due Date
Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans, Accounting for 76% of Total Volume,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 11 (July 9, 2009),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantomdemand-final.pdf.
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Susanne Montezemolo, The State of Lending in America & Its Impact on U.S.
Households, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3 (Sept. 2013),
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more and more money, the attending fees also increase, leaving borrowers
stuck in “debt traps.”28
Debt traps pose serious consequences for borrowers. Studies have
found that people who take out payday loans are more likely to file for
bankruptcy29 and become delinquent on their credit card payments.30
Borrowers are more likely to pay other bills late, delay their medical care
and prescription drug purchases,31 and lose their bank accounts because of
excessive overdrafts.32 Another study found that over half of borrowers
default on their payday loans within one year.33 Most payday loan
borrowers are teetering on the edge of the middle-class,34 meaning that
debt traps can easily send them into poverty.

B. “Rent-a-Tribe” Schemes
Native American communities are struggling economically. The
U.S. Census Bureau found that 27% of Native Americans lived in poverty,
the highest poverty rate of any racial group.35 In 2000, Native Americans’
median wealth was equal to only 8.7 percent of the median wealth among
all Americans.36 This may be partially attributable to Native Americans’
low home ownership rate and home values, both of which are dwarfed by

28

See Saunders et al., supra note 14; see also King & Parish, supra note 26. The
“debt trap” describes when a consumer takes out a loan that she cannot pay back
with her income and is, as a result, forced to take out more loans to pay the old
ones. These new loans create new debt obligations she cannot repay, which then
forces her to take out even more loans. This cycle continues until the consumer is
“trapped” in debt.
29
Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?,
62 J. L. & ECON. 485, 485 (2019).
30
Sumit Argawal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and
Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 412, 412 (2009).
31
Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday
Lending Market, 126 Q. J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011).
32
Dennis Campbell et al., Bouncing out of the Banking System: An Empirical
Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 1224, 1225
(2012).
33
Paige Martin Skiba & Jeremy Tobacaman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and
Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default, at 1
(Vand. Sch. of L., L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Ser. No. 08-33, 2008).
34
King & Parish, supra note 26, at 16.
35
Suzanne Macartney et al., Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and
Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (Feb.
2013), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2013/acs/acsbr11-17.pdf.
36
Algernon Austin, Native Americans and Jobs: The Challenge and the Promise,
ECON. POL’Y INST. 3 (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.epi.org/files/2013/NATIVEAMERICANS-AND-JOBS-The-Challenge-and-the-Promise.pdf.
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those of white Americans.37 Even when controlling for factors like age,
sex, education level, and state of residence, Native Americans are 31%
less likely to be employed than white people.38 The figures are even worse
for Native Americans living on reservations. In 2005, the average
unemployment rate for Native Americans on or near reservations was
49%.39 Facing serious economic hardship, remotely located tribes have
increasingly turned to e-commerce as a source of revenue.40
This is where payday lending companies come in, providing tribes
the investment capital to start online payday businesses. In exchange, these
businesses receive tribal sovereign immunity from their association with
the tribe,41 which they can use to sidestep state regulation for a greater
profit.42 Some commentators call these arrangements “rent-a-tribe”
schemes,43 which have become so popular that one can find several online
consulting companies claiming to be expert in the process.44 In its best
iteration, a tribal lending entity (“TLE”) will maintain offices on tribal
lands, operate its computer servers there, and employ tribal personnel.45
Generally, though, TLEs use many non-tribal subcontractors;46 and
because outside companies finance the entire enterprise, nearly all of the
revenues from the entities flow to them and not the tribe.47 To give one
example, Adrian Rubin, an owner of multiple payday companies, agreed
to send a relatively small monthly commission to an unnamed tribe in
California on the condition that it pretend to own and operate the lending
37
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Jenadee Nanini, Note, Tribal Sovereignty and Fintech Regulations: The Future
of Co-Regulating in Indian Country, 1 GEO. LAW. TECH. REV. 503, 504 n.6 (citing
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 21.04 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2015)).
40
Id. at 504.
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See Heather L. Petrovich, supra note 9, at 341–45; Hilary Miller, The Future of
Tribal Lending Under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, BUS. L.
TODAY (2013), https://perma.cc/XF2Z-ES3C (detailing the legal risks and
benefits of tribal lending models).
42
See Paul Walsh and Neal St. Anthony, State bars internet lender, wins $11.7M
settlement over ‘rent a tribe’ loans, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://perma.cc/53GT-P97J.
43
See Petrovich, supra note 9, at 341–45; see also Ben McLannahan, US
authorities in crackdown on “rent-a-tribe” payday lenders, FIN. TIMES (June 28,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/82ca6198-1dc3-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.
44
See, e.g., LEANING ROCK FIN., https://www.consultants4tribes.com/leaningrock-finance/
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
45
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companies and claim tribal immunity if anyone alleged state law
violations.48 The Justice Department eventually tried and convicted Rubin
on RICO,49 conspiracy, and mail fraud charges.50 No one knows how many
other online payday lenders are engaging in bad faith “rent-a-tribe”
schemes akin to Rubin’s because tribal sovereign immunity can bar state
suits before robust discovery takes place, and the lessened disclosure
requirements for corporations chartered under tribal law limit what
discovery can ultimately reveal.51 A recent surge of RICO complaints
alleging that many online lenders are “renting” tribes may indicate that the
practice is common.52

II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND REGULATION
This section will describe the legal doctrines granting Internet
TLEs immunity, as well as state and federal regulation of payday lending.
The Marshall Court recognized Native American tribes as quasisovereigns entitled to immunity in the early 19th century, and this
recognition prompted the United States Supreme Court to begin to
announce robust protections for Native American tribes in the middle of
the 20th century. Lower federal and state courts have also developed legal
standards for tribal sovereign immunity, most notably the arm of the tribe
analysis. States—with limited success—have tried to regulate payday
lending with usury laws, while the federal government has not enacted any
comprehensive regulation.

A. The Supreme Court Doctrine
Sovereign immunity is a federal common law principle that
precludes sovereign governments from being sued without their consent,
except in very narrow circumstances.53 Lacking a clear textual basis in the
Constitution, sovereign immunity emanates from the inherent powers of

48

Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Co-Conspirator of Reputed “Godfather of
Payday Lending” Sentenced to Prison and Ordered to Forfeit $9,621,800 (Aug. 7,
2018) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
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18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1970).
50
DOJ Press Release, supra note 48.
51
See Petrovich, supra note 9, at 343–44.
52
See, e.g., Hengle v. Curry, No. 3:18-cv-100, 2018 U.S. Dist. WL 3016289 (E.
D. Va. June 15, 2018); Gibbs v. Stinson, 421 F. Supp. 3d 267 (E. D. Va. 2019);
Brice v. Plain Green, LLC., 372 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
53
Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 662
(2002).
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sovereignty.54 The Supreme Court first recognized the federal
government’s immunity from nonconsensual suits in 1821,55 and since
then the doctrine has become firmly established in the Court’s
jurisprudence.56 In addition to the federal government, state governments57
and foreign governments58 enjoy sovereign immunity in American courts.
Congress has waived federal59 and foreign sovereign immunity in some
instances,60 while the Court has developed several exceptions to state
sovereign immunity in its case law.61
As “‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent
sovereign authority over their members and territories,” Native American
tribes also enjoy sovereign immunity from suit.62 The Marshall Court first
recognized tribes as “independent nations” possessing “absolute
sovereignty” in Johnson v. M’Intosh, but allowed the discovery doctrine
to undermine tribes’ property interests nevertheless.63 Eight years later, in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court held that tribes were “domestic
dependent nations,” a status which deprived the Cherokee tribe of diversity
jurisdiction afforded to “foreign state[s]” under the Constitution.64 The
Court continued to refine its jurisprudence in Worcester v. Georgia, in
which it ruled that members of the Cherokee Nation could not be
prosecuted under a Georgia statute.65 It explained that the Cherokee
Nation’s sovereign status meant that “the laws of Georgia [could] have no
force” in Cherokee territory, and that only Congress could regulate “the

54

See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO
81. (Alexander Hamilton)).
55
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821).
56
See generally Seisltad, supra note 53 (detailing the doctrinal history of tribal
immunity in the Supreme Court).
57
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999).
58
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311–13 (2010).
59
See, e.g., Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1946).
60
See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
61
For example, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), plaintiffs can sue state officials in limited
circumstances.
62
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831)).
63
21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
64
30 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1831).
65
31 U.S. 515, 556–57, 559 (1832). The Court later abrogated Worcester in
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001), where it held that generally applicable
state laws could apply to off-reservation conduct by tribal officials.
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intercourse between the United States and this nation.”66 It took until 1850
for the Court to extend sovereign immunity to tribal officials.67
While the above cases laid the foundation for the tribal sovereign
immunity doctrine, the Court officially recognized tribal sovereign
immunity as a federal common law mainstay in 1940 in United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (USF&G).68 The case arose after
the United States leased lands to a coal company as a trustee for the
Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations.69 When the lessee went into
receivership, the United States sought to recover royalties on behalf of the
tribes in a bankruptcy proceeding.70 The coal company responded with a
cross-claim against the tribes.71
The Court held that the coal company could not file its crossclaim. In keeping with its other holdings, the Court reiterated that Native
American tribes are immune from suit absent Congressional authorization
or their own waiver.72 The Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations did not waive
their immunity from suit when they filed for bankruptcy in a federal
tribunal, either, because their sovereign immunity could not depend on the
jurisdiction in which their debtors resided.73 Tribes’ “unusual
governmental organization and peculiar problems” made this reasoning
“particularly applicable” to their circumstances.74 Harkening back to tribal
sovereign immunity’s foundations, the Court cited Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia for the “public policy” goal that dependent sovereigns like tribal
nations are exempt from suit.75 Effective protection of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia’s “public policy” required cross-claims to be as ineffective as
direct suits.76
In the decades following USF&G, the Court consistently
reaffirmed that Native American tribes possess robust sovereign immunity
protections. It has held that corporations can be entitled to a tribe’s
66

Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
See Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 374–75 (1850).
68
309 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1940).
69
Id. at 510–11.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 512 (“It is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed
to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.”).
73
Id. at 513 (“The sovereignty possessing immunity should not be compelled to
defend against cross-actions away from its own territory or in courts, not of its
own choice, merely because its debtor was unavailable except outside the
jurisdiction of the sovereign’s consent.”).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 512–13.
76
Id.
67
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sovereign immunity.77 It prevented enforcement of state fishing laws78 and
the Indian Civil Rights Act against tribes.79 It has barred states from
enforcing lawful tax provisions for on-reservation transactions.80 Most
relevant to online payday lenders, the Court held in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies that sovereign immunity
protected tribes governmental and commercial activities, on- and offreservation.81 Now, 80 years after UFS&G, the broad rule is that Native
American tribes will enjoy sovereign immunity unless the tribe explicitly
waives its immunity or Congress abrogates it.82

B. Arm of the Tribe Tests
Although the Supreme Court has provided plenty of case law on
when sovereign immunity protects Native Americans tribes, it has not
spoken on how to determine when this immunity applies to tribes’ business
entities.83 This question is especially relevant for tribally-affiliated online
lenders; its answer determines whether they will face legal culpability in
many instances. Some state and federal appellate courts developed “arm
of the tribe” tests to fill the vacuum the Supreme Court has left. These
tests, broadly speaking, ask whether the business entity in question is truly
a functionary of the tribe and not merely a third-party company employing
something like a “rent-a-tribe” scheme.
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court in 2010 came out with
a three-factor arm of the tribe test, in which it evaluated “(1) whether the
tribes created the entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes own
and operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects
the tribes’ sovereignty.”84 In 2016, the California Supreme Court
announced a five-factor test which considers “(1) the entity’s method of
creation, 2) whether the tribe intended the entity to share in its immunity,
(3) the entity’s purpose, (4) the tribe’s control over the entity; and (5) the
financial relationship between the tribe and the entity.”85 California’s test
originated in the Tenth Circuit in Breakthrough Management Group, Inc.

77

538 U.S. at 705 n.1 (2003).
Puyallup Tribe, Inc., v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173 (1977).
79
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
80
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 514, (1991).
81
523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998).
82
Id. at 759–60.
83
Petrovich, supra note 9, at 335.
84
Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d
1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010).
85
People v. Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th 222, 244 (Cal. 2016).
78
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v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort.86 Other circuits have found
Breakthrough’s analysis convincing and adopted its factors, too.87 The
California Supreme Court left out Breakthrough’s sixth factor—whether
“the policies underlying tribal sovereign immunity and its connection to
tribal economic development . . . are served by granting immunity to the
economic entities”88—because it believed that the first five factors
“properly account[ed] for” these considerations.89
The two state tests differ in that California considers the entity’s
purpose and the financial link between the tribe and lender90 whereas
Colorado does not.91 The discrepancies in different states’ tests means that
tribal lending entities will be entitled to sovereign immunity in some states
but not others.92 The California and Colorado cases above reflect this
phenomenon: lending entities associated with the Miami Tribe of
Oklahoma and the Santee Sioux Nation were being sued in both decisions,
yet only in Colorado were they afforded tribal sovereign immunity.93 The
possibility of variation like this has prompted some to call for
comprehensive action from Congress.94

86

629 F.3d 1173, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010). Just this year, the Arizona Supreme Court
adopted all six of the Breakthrough factors in Hwal’Bay Ba: J Enters., Inc. v.
Jantzen, No. CV-19-0123-PR, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS 64 at *15 (Feb. 24, 2020).
87
White v. Univ. of California, 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014); Williams v.
Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2019).
88
Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1191.
89
Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th at 244. This discussion should contextualize
the “Our Business” section on Big Picture Loans’ website. The page says that the
company’s purpose is to “enhance the Tribe’s self-determination and further
diversify the Tribe’s economy”; that it was formed under tribal law; and that it is
located on reservation. These statements are best read as attempts to fulfill
Breakthrough factors (6), (1), and possibly (4), respectively. About Us, BIG
PICTURE LOANS, http://www.bigpictureloans.com/about-us (last visited Apr. 7,
2020).
90
Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th at 244.
91
Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d
1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010).
92
Adam Crepelle, Tribal Lending and Tribal Sovereignty, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 1,
24 (2018).
93
On remand, the Colorado district court dismissed the suit against the TLEs.
State v. Cash Advance, No. 05CV1143, 2012 Colo. Dist. Court LEXIS 3032 at
40 (Feb. 13, 2012).
94
See e.g., Crepelle, supra note 92, at 34.
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C. State Regulation
States generally attempt to regulate payday lenders with usury
laws. These laws cap the amount of money lenders can give out, set
limits on their interest rates, and limit the length of loans’ terms.96 Some
regulations even specify the number of loans someone can have
outstanding and the number of times loans may be rolled over.97 Loan caps
range from $300 to $50,000, while loan term limits span from less than
two weeks to 60 days.98 Interest rate caps vary substantially.99 Instead of
regulating payday lenders’ practices, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia have chosen to ban them entirely.100
95

Although these laws appear robust and straightforward, payday
lenders find many ways to avoid them, and not just by claiming tribal
immunity. Indeed, a 2016 report by the Democrats on the House Financial
Services Committee found that payday lenders disguise themselves as
different financial services providers, give out loans under mortgage
lending statutes, abuse loopholes, and ignore laws entirely when
distributing loans online.101 Lenders also form shell companies to hide
their businesses from regulators.102 Tribal immunity presents its own set
of problems, too. Because payday lenders make tribal immunity claims at
the pleading stage, courts can dismiss state regulatory enforcement cases
before they go to discovery.103 And because states bear the burden of
proving that lenders are not entitled to immunity, states must argue that
lenders are not arms of the tribe without the useful information full
discovery can provide.104 Courts do allow a limited amount of discovery
before these motions, but how helpful that is to state regulators is
questionable.105 These problems have lead some state regulators to give up
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enforcing state laws against tribal lending entities entirely,106 and the small
number of state cases on the matter may reflect state regulators’ hesitance
to bring enforcement actions.107 In 2016, the California Supreme Court
granted relief after the state successfully brought suit against tribally
affiliated lenders,108 but remains the only state supreme court to allow
regulatory action to proceed against tribally-affiliated lenders pleading
tribal sovereign immunity for on-reservation activity.

D. Federal Regulation
Congress has not passed a comprehensive statute regulating online
payday lenders.109 A Senate bill that would cap interest rates at 36%
remains stuck in committee.110 The Supreme Court has made clear that
Congress can waive tribal sovereign immunity.111 Whether it will, though,
is a different question. The payday lobby is reportedly quite influential in
Congress,112 as are some Native American industry lobbies.113 With the
Consumer Financial and Protection Bureau set to withdraw proposed rules
regulating payday lenders,114 sweeping federal regulation appears
unlikely.
That is not to say there has been no federal action, however.
Notably, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has brought suit against
online lenders115 seeking to enforce § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA).116 Section 5 prohibits “unfair or deceptive” practices in or
affecting interstate commerce.117 For example, in a 2016 case, the FTC
secured a $25.5 million settlement against several lenders who violated §
106
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5 by charging borrowers undisclosed and inflated fees.118 As a generally
applicable federal law, the FTCA presumptively applies to triballyaffiliated lenders,119 so the FTC can bring § 5 actions without having to
clear the tribal immunity bar. Having said that, the FTC still must operate
within its statutory mandates; it cannot enforce state laws nor can it bring
actions that Congress has not authorized.120 This makes FTC enforcement
a powerful, but circumscribed tool for regulating tribal lenders.

III. GINGRAS: A NEW WAY FORWARD?
Much of this Note has detailed the problems state regulators and
consumers who want to take action against TLEs face. Indeed, tribal
immunity is a robust protection and difficult to nullify at the pleading
stage, making state regulatory efforts useless against many TLEs. Gingras
v. Think Finance, Inc.121 may signal that this dynamic is over. There, the
Second Circuit allowed an injunctive suit, based on state law, to proceed
beyond the pleading stage against employees of a TLE.122 In so holding, it
joined the Eleventh Circuit123 in concluding that tribal sovereign immunity
does not bar state law injunctive suits against tribal officials or
employees.124 This decision could prove a winning countermeasure for
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate state law claims against TLEs claiming
tribal sovereign immunity.
The Gingras plaintiffs borrowed money from Plain Green, an
online payday lender owned by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky
Boy’s Indian Reservation in Montana.125 Plaintiffs, residents of Vermont,
sought an injunction against some of Plain Green’s officers for violating
state and federal law after the Plaintiffs failed to pay back some of their
118
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loans.126 Their complaint alleged that Plain Green’s interest rates exceeded
the caps imposed by Vermont law.127 The complaint also alleged that
Think Finance, which Plain Green employed to service their loan,
orchestrated a rent-a-tribe scheme with the Chippewa Tribe designed to
circumvent state and federal lending laws.128 The defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiffs’ suit, arguing that their status as an “arm of the tribe”
entitled them to tribal sovereign immunity.129 The district court denied the
motion, which the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit.130
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.131 The
court decided that it did not have to determine whether the defendants were
arms of the Chippewa Tribe, because the Supreme Court case Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Community132 condoned injunctive suits, based on state
law, against tribal officials or employees.133 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ suit
would be valid regardless of the defendants’ entitlement to tribal sovereign
immunity. Similarly, in Bay Mills, the Supreme Court held that the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act134 did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity
from a state’s suit to enjoin off-reservation gaming, and thus Michigan
could not bring suit against the Bay Mills Indian Community for opening
up a casino off tribal lands.135 The Court suggested, however, that
“Michigan could bring suit against tribal officials or employees (rather
than the tribe itself) for, say, gambling without a license.”136 Under an
analogy to Ex parte Young,137 explained the Court, “tribal immunity does
not bar such suit[s] for injunctive relief against individuals, including tribal
officers, responsible for unlawful conduct.”138 This “panoply of tools”
126
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meant that the Court’s holding on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did
not leave Michigan and other states without recourse to enforce their laws
against tribal entities.139
The Second Circuit concluded that the Court’s language endorsed
plaintiffs’ state law claims and rejected the defendants’ arguments to the
contrary.140 The defendants first tried arguing that Bay Mills’ key language
was only dicta and accidentally overturned the Court’s holding in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.141 There, the Court
declined to extend the Ex parte Young doctrine to suits against state
officials violating state law, because those suits did not vindicate the
supremacy of federal law and invaded state sovereignty.142 In the Second
Circuit’s mind, however, the suit at bar did not implicate the concerns
about sovereignty animating Pennhurst.143 Principles of sovereignty
prevent federal courts from instructing a state official how to follow state
law or a tribal official how to follow tribal law; those principles do not
apply to compelling a tribal official to follow state or federal law.144 The
defendants also tried arguing that Bay Mills applied to only individual
capacity, as opposed to official capacity, suits against tribal officials or
employees violating state law.145 The court declined to accept “such a
cramped reading,” instead interpreting Bay Mills as distinguishing only
between tribal officials, employees, and the tribe itself.146 Last, the
defendants contended that Bay Mills authorized only Ex parte Young-like
suits against tribal official or employees by states themselves, but the
Second Circuit found nothing in the case law foreclosing those suits based
on the identity of the plaintiff.147
Gingras could be a sign of things to come for TLEs violating state
law. Especially significant is that the Second Circuit did not even address
the arm of the tribe question,148 which, as this Note has discussed,
frustrated past state regulatory efforts. Under Gingras, state and consumer
plaintiffs would no longer be forced to argue against motions to dismiss
with one hand tied behind their back; instead, plaintiffs can avoid the
question of sovereign immunity and proceed directly to the merits. And
without the benefit of presumptive tribal sovereign immunity, online
139
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payday lenders will not be able to violate state law with impunity. The
Second Circuit appeared to be aware that tribal sovereign immunity had
been abused by payday lenders in the past, and that their decision could
help put an end to it, observing, “[a]bsent this mechanism for a state to
enforce its laws against out-of-state tribal officials, the state and its citizens
would seemingly be without recourse.”149 Indeed, Gingras and its
reasoning provide state and individual plaintiffs the opportunity to hold
online payday lenders accountable for violating state law and ensnaring
unwitting borrowers in the “debt trap.” Hopefully, the “recourse” the
Second Circuit furnished will help minimize the significant financial risks
online payday lenders pose to borrowers.

CONCLUSION
Without comprehensive federal regulation, states and consumers
have struggled to pursue legal remedies against Internet TLEs. For a while
it appeared that tribal sovereign immunity could overcome almost any
state regulatory effort, leaving plaintiffs “without recourse” to vindicate
state law claims. Gingras could portend better things for plaintiffs. Under
Gingras, states and consumers may finally be able to seek “recourse” in
the federal courts. The availability of federal forums should mean that
Internet TLEs and their employees will feel more compelled to respect
state law, or else face injunctive suit in federal court. Indeed, if other
circuits adopt the Second Circuit’s reading of Bay Mills, it will be that
rent-a-tribe schemes who are violating state law without effective answers,
for a change.
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